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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Perhaps the best means of obviation of these difficulties is also the
simplest-elimination of the purpose inquiry. After all, one wonders why
even the most fastidious atheist would object to a statute, the admitted
purpose of which is the establishment of an official religion, but which is
wholly ineffectual to accomplish that result.
Since the Court did not summarily dispose of the exemption issue
as it apparently could have," it would seem that it considered Walz to be
an appropriate vehicle for definitive exposition of its views on the establish-
ment clause. Walz does indicate that the Court will use the free exercise
clause and a degree test to limit the operation of the establishment clause,
especially when the "aid," albeit substantial, is afforded equally to all
religions. Adoption of a degree test was an appropriate step towards more
refined consideration of establishment issues, but the unfortunate use of
church-state "involvement" per se, without clarification, as the mea-
sure of the validity of the exemption has not contributed to that goal,
and it still remains for the Court to do what it has already said the first
amendment does with respect to church-state relations-"studiously [de-
fine] the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other. 4 5
R. B. TUCKER, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Application of the Doctrine of Collateral
Estoppel to State Criminal Prosecutions
In Ashe v. Swenson' the Supreme Court has constitutionally required a
variation of the civil law doctrine of collateral estoppel for state criminal
trials.' The Court defined collateral estoppel as the principle that "when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any
"See p. - & note 9 supra.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
1 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
2 Collateral estoppel, as required in criminal cases is distinguishable in two
ways from that traditionally applied in the civil law. First, the requirement of
mutuality-that a party cannot benefit from the doctrine unless he would be bound
by it if the opposite result had been reached-is not carried over into the criminal
law. Second, the general verdict of a criminal trial requires some speculation as
to its basis that the special verdict of the civil trial often does not. For a good dis-
cussion of the problems of mutuality and the general verdict see Note, Collateral
Estoppel in Crimilal Cases, 28 U. GCEi. L. R v. 142 (1960).
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future lawsuit." 3 This note will explore the justification for, and the
ramifications of, the adoption of collateral estoppel as a constitutional
requirement in state criminal trials.
Ashe was charged with six separate counts of armed robbery arising
out of his alleged participation, with three others, in the armed robbery of
six members of a single poker game. Ashe was first tried on one of those
counts, for the robbery of one of the victims, and the jury, although not
instructed to elaborate on its verdict, found him not guilty by reason of
insufficient evidence. The only contested issue at that trial was the
identity of Ashe as one of the robbers; and the prosecution witnesses,
four of the six victims, gave weak testimony on this point.4
Six weeks later Ashe was tried on a second count for the robbery of
another of the victims. At this trial the prosecution witnesses gave much
stronger testimony,3 and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Su-
preme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction denying Ashe's plea of
former jeopardy;' Ashe then brought a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
The district court denied the writ,7 the court of appeals affirmed,8 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Justice Stewart,
writing the Court's opinion, held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was inherent in the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy
and, therefore, enforceable against the states.10 Justice Stewart said that
the single issue determined in the first trial was that there was reasonable
doubt that Ashe was one of the robbers and that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel prevented the state from retrying this issue in the second trial.
In the single dissent Chief Justice Burger argued that collateral
estoppel is not inherent in the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy, remarking that if it is, it has eluded judges and justices for
* 397 U.S. at 443.
' One of the witnesses said Ashe sounded much like one of the robbers, and
another identified Ashe by his size and actions. Two of the prosecution witnesses
thought there had only been three robbers and were unable to identify Ashe as one
of them. Id. at 438.
'Two witnesses who had been unable to identify Ashe now said his features
matched those of one of the robbers. Id. at 440.
' State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967).8 Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968).
'Ashe v. Swenson, 393 U.S. 1115 (1969).
10397 U.S. at 445. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment. In a companion case to
Benton, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court accorded full
retroactivity to the Benton doctrine.
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two centuries and that collateral estoppel is not applicable in the Ashe fact
pattern because the basis of the jury's verdict is not readily determinable.
The Chief Justice visualized the guesswork required to discern the ver-
dict's basis, when all the court has before it is a general verdict from a
jury allowed to reach inconsistent results, as an inherent and fatal weak-
ness in the use of collateral estoppel in criminal trials.
The United States Supreme Court had earlier wrestled with the
problem of collateral estoppel in criminal prosecutions both in supervisory
review over the federal courts and constitutional review over the state
courts." Justice Stewart pointed out in Ashe that collateral estoppel is
an established principle in federal criminal law. 2 However, when previ-
ously confronted with a fact pattern almost identical to that in Ashe, the
Court had implied in Hoag v. New Jersey'" that collateral estoppel was
not a doctrine of constitutional proportions. 4 The Court purported to
explain the inconsistency of Ashe and Hoag by saying, "The doctrine of
Benton ... puts the issues in a perspective quite different from that in
which the issues were perceived in Hoag v. New Jersey. The question
is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process,
but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy."' 15
Justice Stewart cites no authority for the proposition that collateral
estoppel is embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy and dismissed this question by stating, "Whether its [collateral
estoppel's] basis was a constitutional one was a question of no more than
academic concern until this Court's decision in Benton v. Maryland."'6
Indeed, the cases Justice Stewart cited as authority for his statement that
collateral estoppel is an established rule of federal law seem to consider
I11n supervisory review over the federal courts the Supreme Court required
collateral estoppel in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), and held
it could be used even with a general verdict in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948). The court of appeals held that lack of mutuality would not be a bar
to the use of collateral estoppel in United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1961). In constitutional review over the state courts the Supreme Court refused
to require collateral estoppel in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
12 397 U.S. at 443.
'a 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
1
"The Supreme Court said that "[d]espite its wide employment, we entertain
grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional require-
ment. Certainly this court has never so held." Id. at 471. The decision, however,
was based on other grounds.
2r 397 U.S. at 442.
10 d. at 446-47 n.10.
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collateral estoppel and the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy as separate doctrines. In United States v. Oppenheimert 7 the
Court said, regarding collateral estoppel, that "the Fifth Amendment
was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental
principle of justice .... -18 In Sealfon v. United States' the Court
granted the petitioner relief on grounds of collateral estoppel after he had
abandoned his plea of double jeopardy. This implies a difference in the
doctrines. In the other major case cited by Justice Stewart, United States
v. Kramer,20 the court also construed the fifth amendment's double
jeopardy protection and collateral estoppel as separate doctrines.2 Thus
there is at least some basis for Chief Justice Burger's complaint that the
Court is taking a step in constitutional law on no more than a feeling that
retrial of issues has the same double "run [ning of] the gantlet"2 2 effect that
the fifth amendment guarantees against for retrial of offenses.
In examining the policy considerations involved in deciding whether
the Court was correct in adopting collateral estoppel as a requirement for
the states, it is important to stress one thing at the outset. The question
is not which policy is fairest or most efficacious; but rather it is, in light
of our federal system, which policy is required by the Constitution.
However, the Court does have considerable leeway in deciding whether
collateral estopel is "embodied" in the fifth amendment, and in this light
it is important to consider what might influence a decision based on this
question.
In Ashe the Court wanted to prevent a state prosecutor from using
the separate crimes involved in a multiple-victim situation to give the
state an advantage over the defendant. Justice Stewart said:
[The state] treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the
second prosecution: "No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a
provable case on the first charge and, when he lost ... he refined his
17242 U.S. 85 (1916).18Id. at 88.
'- 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
2 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
"Kramer appeals from the District Court's overruling of his contention
that the Connecticut judgment barred a later prosecution under the clause
of the Fifth Amendment forbidding that "any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," and, alternatively, that
it precluded the Government from relitigating issues necessarily determined
in the earlier trial. We hold the District Court was right as to the former,
wrong as to the latter.
Id. at 912.22397 U.S. at 465.
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presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial." But this is
precisely what the constitutional guarantee forbids.2
3
Certainly, the prevention of intentional harassment of defendants is a
worthwhile objective. To what extent will collateral estoppel achieve this
objective? An analysis of the holding in Ashe shows that its protection
is not as far reaching as it sounds. The Court held that when a defendant
has been acquitted of one crime arising from a multiple-victim transaction,
and the facts of the case shows the reasons for the jury's decision are un-
arguably clear,24 the states will be precluded from relitigation of these
previously decided points. From this statement of the holding we can see
that collateral estoppel would be of no benefit to a defendant if (a) the
first trial resulted in a conviction; (b) the conclusion of the jury could not
be readily determined, as would be the case if Ashe had contested the issue
of whether a robbery in fact took place as well as whether he was one of
the perpetrators of it; or (c) the issue decided in the first trial was not
conclusive as to the offense in the second trial. For example, if the first
jury had based the acquittal on a finding that nothing was taken from
the victim, this would not prevent a second trial on the question of
whether anything was taken from a different victim. Also, there are sev-
eral different types of offenses that can result in multiple crimes, and the
protection given to Ashe in the multiple-victim case might not be accorded
to a defendant accused of a different type of multiple crime. In a recent
case, United States v. Fusco,25 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, citing Ashe, that collateral estoppel would apply to prevent
subsequent prosecution for crimes distinct in terminology. After Fusco's
conviction for theft was reversed on appeal without remand,2 6 his sub-
sequent conviction for possession of the stolen goods was reversed be-
cause "It]he ultimate fact of Fusco's involvement ... already had been
determined .... ,2 Another area of subsequent prosecutions, one which
was mentioned in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Ashe, was that
of subsequent prosecutions for crimes that are separable chronologically.
In the celebrated case of Johnson v. Commonwealth,28 seventy-five poker
2 Id. at 447.
"' The Court found that the reason the jury found Ashe not guilty in the first
trial could only have been that they believed he was not one of the participants. Id.
at 446.
"427 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970).
2'398 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1968).2 427 F.2d at 363.
"201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
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hands were held to be seventy-five separate offenses of gambling. It does
not follow that collateral estoppel would be applicable in this situation
because one hand of poker may not, due to an absence of betting for
example, have reached the statutory level of gambling while the next
hand may have.29
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, concurred
with Justice Stewart's majority opinion that collateral estoppel should
apply but added that the doctrine of double jeopardy alone should bar the
subsequent conviction. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb . . . ."" In determining what constitutes the same offense the
Court has looked to the "same evidence" test--if different evidence is
required, the offenses are different. Justice Brennan insisted that the "same
transaction" test should be substituted and that any crimes arising from a
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction should be treated
as the same offense for fifth amendment purposes. 2
Would Justice Brennan's "same transaction" test go further than the
collateral estoppel rule in preventing harassment of defendants by multiple
trials? Undoubtedly, yes. If the double jeopardy theory is followed, there
could be no subsequent trials when the basis of the jury's first acquittal
was unclear or even when the first trial resulted in a conviction. A type
of merger would operate because the double jeopardy theory would prevent
retrial of any part of the single transaction. Even though the "same trans-
action" test for double jeopardy would prevent most of the harassment of
defendants by multiple trials, there are still valid reasons for opposing its
adoption. It is not clear that this rule would work completely to the
defendant's advantage. There are certainly situations where the defendant
29An interesting area for expansion of collateral estoppel as used in criminal
law appears in the multiple-criminal cases. The Supreme Court has said that the
lack of mutuality poses no problem for the use of collateral estoppel. 397 U.S. at
443. Does it not follow that it should not have to be the same party pleading the
estoppel? If two defendants are charged with auto theft, and the sole issue in the
trial of the first was whether the prosecuting witness had given permission to use
the car, should not the second defendant be able to rely on an acquittal of the first
defendant to estop the state from relitigation of the issue of permission?
"
0 U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
" Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
32 397 U.S. at 453-54. Justice Harlan concurred with the majority opinion in
Ashe but made the specific reservation that the decision was not to include the
adoption of the "same transaction" test advanced by Justice Brennan in his con-
curring opinion. Id. at 448.
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would prefer not to have the whole transaction tried in one trial.m So-
ciety's interest in convicting the guilty also must be weighed. Perhaps we
do not want always to force prosecutors to try defendants for multiple
crimes in a single trial. The possibility of cross issues and confusion in
particularly complex crimes is apparent. The example of a man killing his
wife and her paramour in a moment of passion, killing his neighbors
'because they witnessed the first crime, and killing someone else because
he had become insane from all this killing is an unlikely one; but it does
show that it is possible for what might be considered a single transaction
with only one defendant to have some very complex issues involved.
In considering the equities involved in multiple trials the individualist
might point to the freedom of choice on the defendant's part. Essentially,
it is the defendant who decides to commit multiple crimes, and viewed
from this perspective one might say that he is subjecting himself to the
possibility of multiple trials." While the Ashe fact pattern does not pre-
sent a very appealing case for the idea of choice because we view the
decision as one of robbing a "game," is it really unfair to require a
defendant accused of individually and willfully murdering four bank tellers
during a robbery to come to trial four times? Some crimes are essentially
more like a single transaction than others. This may be more of an
emotional than a rational distinction, but it does seem less unfair to have
multiple trials in the bank teller situation than the Ashe situation. Also,
a problem will arise in defining what is and what is not a "single trans-
action." If a man is accused of passing five hundred bad checks in the past
year, fifty in the past month, ten yesterday, and five in one hour yester-
day, there seems to be no rational distinction for calling one part of that
series a single transaction and not another. If Justice Brennan wants the
" For example, in a trial for rape and robbery, a defendant may well feel that
his chances of being acquitted for either of these offenses would be greatly reduced
by a decision in the mind of the jury that he was guilty of the other. There also
may be a fear on the part of an innocent defendant that a jury, confronted with
several counts arising from a single transaction, may compromise by finding him
guilty of some and innocent of others. Finally, the defendant may fear that the
jury members may harbor the feeling that with all these charges against him, he
must have done something.
"' This analysis is subject to the criticism that it presupposes guilt and does not
take into account the plight of the innocent defendant confronted with multiple
trials. Indeed, it does allow for hardship on the part of the innocent defendant
when there is great evidence against him. However, the requirement of only
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" reflects the belief that a workable system will
involve some such hardship. The innocent defendant with less proof against him
will probably not be brought to trial a second time simply as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion.
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defendant to be tried for all crimes known to the prosecutor when the
defendant is brought to trial, then the problem of complexity mentioned
before will 'be greatly magnified.
These reasons for opposing the adoption of the "same transaction"
test for double jeopardy apply, though with considerably less force, to
the adoption of collateral estoppel. It must be remembered, though, that
collateral estoppel has considerably less effect in curing the abuse of
harassment through multiple trials. However, collateral estoppel has a
preventive side that the total cure-the "same transaction" test for
double jeopardy-does not need. The prosecutor will be forced to try
the defendant for all of the crimes involved in a single transaction because
he cannot know beforehand what will result during the first trial. If he
first .brings the defendant to trial for only one crime in an attempt to feel
out the defense and test his approach, he may well be estopped from
proving a point vital to his prosecution in the subsequent trial for another
of the crimes. Where, heretofore, a multiple-crime transaction has given
the prosecutor virtually a free try at the defendant in which he could
discover the defenses and polish up his case, at least now the prosecutor
k nows that further trials may be foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
After consideration of the policies involved, the result in Ashe appears
to have been the best alternative. The application of collateral estoppel
should result in better prepared prosecutions and less harassment of
defendants without some of the risks of the almost total exclusion of
multiple trials required by the adoption of the "same transaction" test
for determining double jeopardy.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III
Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases Involving
Federally Insured Mortgages
In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v.
Stadium Apartments, Inc.,' the court held that the Federal Housing
" Calling this a free try does, however, ignore the fact that the prosecution has
lost the opportunity to get additional punishment for the additional crime; but the
common practice of concurrent running of the sentences in an Ashe situation com-
bined with the small likelihood that a prosecutor, having secured one conviction,
would bring prosecutions on the other crimes minimizes this distinction.
'425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).
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